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Risk Preference, Time Preference, and Salience Perception
Jonathan Leland

Mark Schneider

A model of decision making is introduced that provides a unified approach to choices under risk and over
time. This model of salience weighted utility over presentations (SWUP) predicts systematic departures
from expected utility and discounted utility using the same mathematical structure and the same
psychological intuition. SWUP explains six parallels between risk and time: (i) the common ratio effect and
common difference effect; (ii) the common consequence effect and cancellation effect; (iii) the peanuts
effect and magnitude effect; (iv) the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes and bias toward concentration; (v) a
downside risk framing effect and opportunity cost framing effect; and (vi) the gain-loss labeling effect and
the date-delay labeling effect. SWUP assigns weights on utility differences that depend on their importance
(their probabilities of occurrence and their proximities of occurrence) and their salience or similarity, and
so provides a bridge between rational and heuristic representations of decision making.
1.

Introduction
In 1937 Paul Samuelson proposed that individuals might choose between consumption plans such

that they maximize their discounted payoff or “utility” (DU) from future consumption. A decade later, von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) proposed that people choose between risky prospects as if they
maximize their expected utility (EU). To this day, these models constitute the standard theories of rational
choice over time and under risk in the social and behavioral sciences. Nevertheless, almost from their
inception, persistent questions have been raised regarding their descriptive accuracy. Friedman and Savage
(1948) objected to the standard assumption in Expected Utility theory that people are uniformly risk averse
while Allais (1953) raised questions regarding the descriptive accuracy of the EU independence axiom.
Strotz (1955) critiqued Discounted Utility theory, expressing concern that people would be unable to
commit themselves to future plans resulting in time-inconsistent choices.
The challenges to the descriptive adequacy of EU and DU raised by Allais, Strotz, and others have
defined the research agenda on individual decision making for over a half a century. Alternative models
have been proposed for risky choice while a very different set of models has been proposed for
intertemporal choice to accommodate the EU and DU anomalies. However, relatively few models have
emerged to explain behaviors in both domains, potentially because risk and time preferences are thought to
reveal very different aspects of behavior: Time preferences reveal some measure of impatience, while risk
preferences reveal an individual characteristic of risk-tolerance.
More recently, Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) have pointed out parallels between anomalies under
risk and over time, suggesting that there might be a fundamental link between behaviors in these domains.
Subsequent work suggests the link involves the way differences in payoffs and probabilities and payoffs
and dates of receipt across alternatives are evaluated and perceived. Rubinstein (1988) noted that an
1

individual choosing to receive $3000 over a lottery offering an 80% chance of winning $4000 might, in
violation of the independence axiom, choose a lottery offering a 20% chance of $4000 over a 25% chance
to win $3000 because the probabilities of 0.25 and 0.20 appear similar in value. Leland (2002) noted that,
by the same reasoning, an individual choosing to receive $20 in 1 month over receiving $25 in 2 months
might, in violation of the stationarity axiom of DU, choose $25 in 12 months over $20 in 11 months if a
delay of 11 months appears similar to a delay of 12 months. Recent work by Bordalo et al. (2012) on the
influence of salient payoff differences in risky choice and Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) on the impact of
focusing on large attribute differences in intertemporal choice lends further credence to the idea that
differential weighting of attribute differences may connect risky and intertemporal behavior.
Building on this possibility, we propose here a unified approach to modeling risky and
intertemporal choice in which behavior in both domains is driven by the interaction between properties of
preferences (which are assumed to satisfy expected utility for risk and discounted utility for time),
properties of salience perception (which are assumed to satisfy diminishing sensitivity to absolute changes
and increasing sensitivity to proportional changes in attribute values), and the frame in which choices are
presented (which determines what differences are compared across alternatives). We then show that simple
operations on a frame generate a comprehensive set of behaviors observed under risk and over time.
2.

Salience Weighted Utility over Presentations
We proceed to model choices in three steps, first providing a formal theory for the framing of risky

and intertemporal choices, then specifying the evaluation process or computational decision algorithm
agents employ to choose between alternatives, and then characterizing the nature of salience perceptions
that drive the evaluation. Taken together, we refer to our model of the choice process, characterization of
the perceptual system, and treatment of frames as Salience Weighted Utility over Presentations (SWUP).
2.1

Frames for Lotteries and Consumption Plans
For the purposes of developing a comparative model of risky and intertemporal choice we begin

by representing the options in a presentation or frame as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Presentations or “Frames” for Decisions under Risk and over Time
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In our setup, for decisions under risk, there is a finite set, 𝑋, of outcomes. A lottery is a mapping
𝑝: 𝑋 → [0,1] such that ∑𝑥∈𝑋 𝑝(𝑥) = 1. Denote the set of all lotteries by ∆(𝑋). We consider one-dimensional
arrays 𝐩 and 𝐪 which represent lotteries 𝑝 and 𝑞 (in a well-defined sense) that offer a finite and equal
number of outcomes denoted 𝐱𝐢 and 𝐲𝐢 , 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, where each 𝐱𝐢 occurs with probability 𝐩𝐢 and each 𝐲𝐢
occurs with probability 𝐪𝐢 . Denote the support of a lottery, 𝑝 (the set of outcomes for which 𝑝(𝑥) > 0) by
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝(𝑝), and denote the number of outcomes in the support of a lottery 𝑝 by |𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝(𝑝)|.
For decisions over discrete time periods t ∈ {0, 1, 2, …, T}, a consumption plan, r, is a sequence
of dated outcomes in 𝑋. Denote the set of consumption plans by 𝐶. We study choices between consumption
plans r and t where 𝑟: = (𝑥0 , 𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑇 ) and 𝑡: = (𝑦0 , 𝑦1 , … , 𝑦𝑇 ). We consider one-dimensional arrays 𝐫 and
𝐭 which represent consumption plans 𝑟 and 𝑡 that offer a finite and equal number of outcomes, where each
outcome 𝐱𝐢 occurs in time period, 𝐫𝐢 and each 𝐲𝐢 occurs in period 𝐭 𝐢 , for all 𝑖. We use bold font for attributes
in an array and italicized font for attributes in the support of a lottery or consumption plan.
To represent a lottery, 𝑝, we employ a one-dimensional array, 𝐩, consisting of 𝑛(𝐩) outcomes and
𝑛(𝐩) corresponding probabilities. Denote the ith outcome in 𝐩 and the ith corresponding probability by xi
and pi, respectively. Notice that outcome-probability pairs appear in no particular order in the array and
some outcomes could be repeated in the array. Hence, many arrays could represent the same lottery.
Definition 1 (Representation of a lottery): An array 𝐩 is a representation of lottery 𝑝 if (i) and (ii) hold:
(i)

For i =1,2,…,𝑛(𝐩), ∑𝐢 𝐩𝐢 = 1

(ii)

For all i such that xi = x, ∑𝐢 𝐩𝐢 = 𝑝(𝑥).

Note that a representation 𝐩 of lottery 𝑝 differs from the lottery itself since it permits the same outcome to
appear more than once in the array provided that the corresponding probabilities sum to the overall
probability of that outcome. Representations of two lotteries presented jointly, constitute a frame.
Definition 2 (Frame for lotteries): A presentation or frame, ⟦𝐩, 𝐪⟧ of lotteries, 𝑝 and 𝑞, is a matrix
containing a representation 𝐩 of 𝑝 and a representation 𝐪 of 𝑞.
In our analysis, we will consider cases where both representations in a frame have the same
dimension, although this dimension can vary across frames.
Similarly, let any 𝑟 ∈ 𝐶 be represented in a one-dimensional array, 𝐫, consisting of 𝑚(𝐫) outcomes
and 𝑚(𝐫) periods. Denote the ith outcome in 𝐫 and the ith corresponding period by xi and ri, respectively.
Definition 3 (Representation of a consumption plan): Array 𝐫 is a representation of 𝑟 ∈ 𝐶 if (i)-(iii) hold:
(i) For any dated outcome, 𝑥𝑡 ≠ 0, the pair (𝐱, 𝐭) is in 𝐫 if and only if 𝑥𝑡 is in 𝑟.
(ii) For any dated outcome 𝑥𝑡 = 0, if the pair (𝐱, 𝐭) is in 𝐫 then 𝑥𝑡 is in 𝑟.
(iii) If there are T dated outcomes in 𝑟, then dim(𝐫) ≤ 2T.

3

A representation 𝐫 of consumption plan 𝑟 differs from the consumption plan itself since it permits
periods of zero consumption to be ‘compressed’ (an outcome of zero and its corresponding time period
might not be in 𝐫). In addition, there is no restriction on the order in which the outcomes in 𝑟 appear in 𝐫.
Finally, property (iii) implies that 𝐫 contains at most all T outcomes and the corresponding T periods. When
two representations of different consumption plans are presented together, they constitute a frame.
Definition 4 (Frame for consumption plans): A presentation or frame, ⟦𝐫, 𝐭⟧ of consumption plans, 𝑟 and
𝑡, is a matrix containing a representation 𝐫 of 𝑟 and a representation t of 𝑡.
We next consider the framing of degenerate lotteries (those yielding a single outcome with
probability 1). Consider a choice between a lottery 𝑝 yielding x with certainty and a non-degenerate lottery
𝑞. It seems almost unavoidable that one compares each outcome in 𝑞 to the unique outcome in 𝑝. We adopt
the convention that a choice with a degenerate lottery is framed as in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Choice Frame with a Degenerate Lottery
\
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We present a model of decision making in which choices are predicted given the frame. In illustrating our
model, we clearly specify the frame, employing the simplest presentation of choices for each example where
outcomes of a non-degenerate lottery are monotonically ordered for choices under risk and in which time
periods are monotonically ordered for choices over time.
2.2

Salience Weighted Utility for Decisions under Risk

Let there be a preference relation, ≻, over ∆(𝑋) reflecting the decision maker’s preferences over lotteries.
The decision maker is assumed to have standard expected utility preferences: For all lotteries 𝑝, 𝑞 ∈ ∆(𝑋),

(1)

𝑝 ≻ 𝑞 if and only if ∑𝑥∈𝑋 𝑝(𝑥)𝑢(𝑥) > ∑𝑦∈𝑋 𝑞(𝑦)𝑢(𝑦).

This is the conventional approach. Next, we ask how might an individual evaluate presentations of lotteries
like the ones in Figure 1? An extensive literature in economics and psychology has demonstrated that even
small changes in presentations can have consequential effects on behavior. To allow for this possibility, let
i = 1, 2, …,n index the location of the ith attribute (payoff, probability) in a frame.
The decision maker is given two arrays and is asked to choose one. Here we consider a second
̂ over representations conditional on the frame which may be viewed as a ‘perceptual relation’
relation ≻
̂ 𝐪 (𝐩 ~
(rather than a preference relation). That is, 𝐩 ≻
̂ 𝐪) means that lottery 𝑝 ‘looks strictly better than’
(‘looks equally as good as’) lottery 𝑞 when a frame ⟦𝐩, 𝐪⟧ presents the lottery pair {𝑝, 𝑞}.
For the generic frame in Figure 1, given (1), an unbiased perceptual relation can be expressed as:
4

(2)

̂ 𝐪 if and only if ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝐩𝐢 𝑢(𝐱𝐢 ) > ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝐪𝐢 𝑢(𝐲𝐢 ),
𝐩≻

for all 𝐩, 𝐪, such that 𝐩 is a representation of 𝑝 and 𝐪 is a representation of 𝑞 and for all 𝑝, 𝑞 ∈ ∆(𝑋).
To account for the role of salience perception in decision making, we let the decision maker use a
“salient” evaluation defined over frames when deciding between alternatives. In particular, salient
comparisons between alternatives may frustrate the expression of the decision maker’s true preferences.
The decision maker may instead be systematically swayed by changes in the arrangement of attributes in a
frame which systematically make some comparisons focal and which make others inconsequential. Rather
than assuming that choices always ‘reveal preferences,’ our approach admits two possibilities whenever the
̂ are not equivalent: In any given situation (i) choices may reveal preferences (consistent
relations ≻ and ≻
with ≻) or (ii) they may reveal systematic deviations from preference maximization due to biases in salience
̂ ).
perception (consistent with ≻
To further motivate the possibility that frames may frustrate the expression of preference, note that
equations (1) and (2) provide an alternative-based evaluation - one lottery is strictly preferred to another,
if and only if it yields a greater expected payoff to the decision maker. Here we allow for the possibility
that agents choose by making across-lottery comparisons of payoffs and their associated probabilities of
occurrence. Building on Leland and Sileo (1998), note that the alternative-based evaluation in (2) may be
̂ 𝐪 if and only if (3) holds:
written equivalently as an attribute-based evaluation such that 𝐩 ≻
(3)

∑𝑛𝑖=1[(𝐩𝐢 − 𝐪𝐢 )(𝑢(𝐱𝐢 ) + 𝑢(𝐲𝐢 ))/2 + (𝑢(𝐱𝐢 ) − 𝑢(𝐲𝐢 ))(𝐩𝐢 + 𝐪𝐢 )/2] > 0.

Note that the evaluation procedures in (2) and (3) operate over frames rather than over lotteries directly.
Nevertheless, (2) and (3) both characterize frame-invariant preferences (they are not sensitive to changes
in frames). The attribute-based evaluation in (3) computes probability differences associated with outcomes
weighted by the average utility of those outcomes plus utility differences of outcomes weighted by their
average probability of occurrence. A decision maker who chooses among representations according to the
attribute-based evaluation in (3) will be indistinguishable from one who chooses according to the
alternative-based evaluation in (2). But now suppose that in the process of comparing risky alternatives an
agent notices when the payoff in one alternative is “a lot more money” than the payoff in another and when
one alternative offers “a much better chance” of receiving an outcome than the other. In these cases, we
will assume that large differences in attribute values across different alternatives are perceived as
particularly salient or attract disproportionate attention and are overweighted in the evaluation process. To
capture this intuition that larger differences in attributes are over-weighted or attract disproportionate
attention, we place salience weights 𝜙(𝐩𝐢 , 𝐪𝐢 ) on probability differences and 𝜇(𝐱𝐢 , 𝐲𝐢 ) on payoff differences,
̂ 𝐪 if and only if (4) holds:
yielding the following model of salience-weighted evaluation, in which 𝐩 ≻
(4)

∑𝑛𝑖=1[𝜙(𝐩𝐢 , 𝐪𝐢 )(𝐩𝐢 − 𝐪𝐢 )(𝑢(𝐱𝐢 ) + 𝑢(𝐲𝐢 ))/2 + 𝜇(𝐱 𝐢 , 𝐲𝐢 )(𝑢(𝐱𝐢 ) − 𝑢(𝐲𝐢 ))(𝐩𝐢 + 𝐪𝐢 )/2] > 0.
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We refer to model (4) as Salience Weighted Utility over Presentations (SWUP). Note that SWUP has a dual
interpretation as a model of salience-based choice that overweights large differences and as a model of
similarity-based choice that underweights small differences.
2.3

Salience Weighted Utility for Decisions over Time
The model extends analogously to choices over time such as those in the lower panel of Figure 1.

Let i = 1,2,…,n denote the position of the ith attribute (payoff, time period) in a frame. For decisions over
time periods t ∈ {0, 1, 2, …, T}, a consumption plan, r, is a sequence of dated outcomes in 𝑋. Denote the
set of consumption plans by 𝐶. Let 𝑟: = (𝑥0 , 𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑇 ) and 𝑡: = (𝑦0 , 𝑦1 , … , 𝑦𝑇 ). As in the discounted utility
model, a decision maker has a preference relation, ≻𝑡 , over consumption plans such that for all 𝑟, 𝑡 ∈ 𝐶,
(5)

𝑟 ≻𝑡 𝑡 if and only if ∑𝑇𝑡=0 𝛿 𝑡 𝑢(𝑥𝑡 ) > ∑𝑇𝑡=0 𝛿 𝑡 𝑢(𝑦𝑡 ),

where 𝛿 ∈ (0,1] is a constant discount factor.
The decision maker is now given two arrays and is asked to choose one. Here we consider the
̂ 𝑡 over representations of consumption plans, given the frame. The relation ≻
̂ 𝑡 may be viewed as
relation ≻
̂ 𝑡 𝐭 (𝐫 ~
a ‘perceptual relation’ (i.e., 𝐫 ≻
̂ 𝑡 𝐭) means that 𝑟 ‘looks strictly better than’ (‘looks equally as good
as’) 𝑡 when a frame ⟦𝐫, 𝐭⟧ presents the pair of consumption plans {𝑟, 𝑡}).
For the generic frame in Figure 1, given (5), a perceptual relation can be expressed as follows:
(6)

𝑚
𝐫𝐢
𝐭𝐢
̂ 𝑡 𝐭 if and only if ∑𝑚
𝐫≻
𝑖=1 𝛿 [𝑢(𝐱 𝐢 )] > ∑𝑖=1 𝛿 [𝑢(𝐲𝐢 )],

for all 𝐫, 𝐭, such that 𝐫 is a representation of 𝑟 and 𝐭 is a representation of 𝑡 and for all 𝑟, 𝑡 ∈ 𝐶.
The alternative-based evaluation in (6) is equivalent to an attribute-based evaluation in which
̂ 𝑡 𝐭 if and only if (7) holds:
𝐫≻
(7)

𝐫𝐢
𝐭𝐢
𝐫𝐢
𝐭𝐢
∑𝑚
𝑖 [(𝛿 − 𝛿 )(𝑢(𝐱 𝐢 ) + 𝑢(𝐲𝐢 ))/2 + (𝑢(𝐱 𝐢 ) − 𝑢(𝐲𝐢 ))(𝛿 + 𝛿 )/2] > 0.

Placing salience weights 𝜃(𝐫𝐢 , 𝐭 𝐢 ) on time differences and 𝜇(𝐱𝐢 , 𝐲𝐢 ) on payoff differences, yields a
̂ 𝑡 𝐭 if and only if:
salience-weighted evaluation in which 𝐫 ≻
𝐫𝐢
𝐭𝐢
𝐫𝐢
𝐭𝐢
(8) ∑𝑚
𝑖 [𝜃(𝐫𝐢 , 𝐭 𝐢 )(𝛿 − 𝛿 )(𝑢(𝐱 𝐢 ) + 𝑢(𝐲𝐢 ))/2 + 𝜇(𝐱 𝐢 , 𝐲𝐢 )(𝑢(𝐱 𝐢 ) − 𝑢(𝐲𝐢 ))(𝛿 + 𝛿 )/2] > 0.

We refer to an agent who chooses according to salience-based evaluation models (formulas 4 and 8) as a
focal thinker since such an agent focuses on salient differences in attributes. Such an agent chooses the
alternative which ‘looks better’, with respect to that agent’s perceptual system. Note that whether one
̂ , depends on the agent’s risk preferences
alternative ‘looks better’ than another to an agent, according to ≻
and time preferences (as measured by 𝑢 and 𝛿, respectively) and the salience agents ascribe to large versus
small differences in payoffs, time delays, and probabilities (as measured by 𝜇, 𝜃, and 𝜙, respectively). In
this respect, SWUP provides a bridge between economic and psychological approaches to decision making
by modeling choice as dependent on both properties of preferences and properties of the perceptual system.
6

In SWUP, differences in attributes are weighted by their salience and by their importance. The
earlier similarity models (e.g., Rubinstein 1988, 2003; Leland 1994, 2002) evaluated differences only by
their similarity or salience and so are very non-compensatory. In contrast, the classical economic models
weight attributes by their ‘importance’, where payoffs are effectively assigned higher importance if they
are more likely to occur (represented by their probability weight in expected utility theory) or if they are
nearer to the present (represented by their discount factor in discounted utility theory). In SWUP, the
probability differences (𝐩𝐢 − 𝐪𝐢 ) are assigned an ‘importance weight’ of (𝑢(𝐱𝐢 ) + 𝑢(𝐲𝐢 ))/2 (probability
differences are more important if they correspond to larger average payoffs), and likewise utility differences
are weighted by (𝐩𝐢 + 𝐪𝐢 )/2 (assigning greater importance to payoffs with larger average probabilities) for
decisions under risk and by (𝛿 𝐫𝐢 + 𝛿 𝐭𝐢 )/2 (assigning greater importance to payoffs with larger average
discount factors) for decisions over time. In this respect, SWUP provides a unified approach to heuristic
models of attribute-based choice and to classical models of rational choice since SWUP includes both a
‘salience weight’ and an ‘importance weight’ on differences in payoffs, probabilities, and delays.
2.4

The Nature of Salience Perceptions
The salience functions 𝜇, 𝜙 and 𝜃 determine the only ways in which a focal thinker differs from a

rational agent who chooses over arrays according to formulas 2 and 6. We assume a salience function
exhibits the two properties of the perceptual system in Definition 5, defined by Bordao et al. (2013).
Definition 5 (Salience Function): A salience function σ(a, b) is any (non-negative), symmetric1
and continuous function that satisfies the following two properties:
1. Ordering: If [𝐚′ , 𝐛′] ⊂ [𝐚, 𝐛] then σ(𝐚′ , 𝐛′ ) < σ(𝐚, 𝐛).
2. Diminishing Absolute Sensitivity (DAS): For any 𝐚, 𝐛, 𝛜 > 0, σ(𝐚 + 𝛜, 𝐛 + 𝛜) < σ(𝐚, 𝐛).
While properties 1 and 2 define a salience function, consistent with Bordalo et al. (2013), we will also allow
for the possibility that a salience function satisfies a third property, increasing proportional sensitivity:
Increasing Proportional Sensitivity (IPS): For any 𝐚𝐛 > 0 and any 𝛂 > 1, σ(𝛂𝐚, 𝛂𝐛) > σ(𝐚, 𝐛).
There is an intuitive relationship between these properties: DAS implies for a fixed absolute difference, that
the perceptual system is more sensitive to larger ratios. IPS implies for a fixed ratio, that perception is more
sensitive to larger absolute differences. Ordering implies that perception is more sensitive to larger intervals
(which have both a larger absolute difference and a larger ratio than the smaller intervals they contain).
Ordering, DAS, and IPS are also supported by the psychology literature. Ordering is consistent
with the “symbolic distance” effect - it takes longer to answer which of two numbers is larger, the smaller

1

A function 𝑓(𝐱, 𝐲) is symmetric if 𝑓(𝐱, 𝐲) = 𝑓(𝐲, 𝐱).
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their arithmetic difference.2 Since the Weber-Fechner law was introduced in the 19th century, it has also
been recognized that diminishing (absolute) sensitivity is a fundamental property of the perceptual system
that applies across a range of sensory modalities including tone, brightness, and distance (Stevens, 1957).
Schley and Peters (2014) provide experimental support that diminishing sensitivity also characterizes how
the brain maps symbolic numbers onto mental magnitudes. Support for the IPS property can be found in
the marketing literature, where IPS is referred to as "the unit effect". Pandelaere et al. (2011), for example,
find that the perceived difference between ratings of 7 and 9 on a 0-10 scale appears smaller than the
difference between 700 and 900 on a 0-1,000 scale. Similarly, Wertenbroch et al. (2007) report that, even
when $1 (in US currency) equals S$1.70 in Singapore currency, “a target price of S$1.70 will appear as
less expensive when evaluated against a target budget of S$17.00 than $1 against $10” (p. 3).
3.

Parallels between Behavior under Risk and over Time
We now consider the implications of SWUP for risky choice and intertemporal choice. We show

that even a parameter-free version of the model simultaneously predicts a wide variety of analogous
behaviors between risk and time. To begin, we let 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥, and we adopt the following parameter-free
specifications for the salience functions that satisfy ordering and diminishing sensitivity:
(9)

𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲) =

|𝐱 − 𝐲|
,
|𝐱| + |𝐲| + 𝟏

𝜙(𝐩, 𝐪) =

|𝐩 − 𝐪|
,
𝐩+𝐪

𝜃(𝐫, 𝐭) =

|𝐫 − 𝐭|
𝐫+𝐭

The payoff salience function 𝜇 is the only one of the salience functions that may take negative values as its
arguments, and there also might be two zero payoff values in the same column vector of a frame. The
specification for 𝜇 ensures that the salience function3 is defined even if 𝐱 = 𝐲 = 0. It also satisfies
increasing proportional sensitivity. In our analysis, we do not embed a constant in the salience functions
for probabilities or delays for simplicity, although doing so would not affect our qualitative results. Each
of the specifications in (9) is a special case of the salience function σ(𝐱, 𝐲) = |𝐱 − 𝐲|/(|𝐱| + |𝐲| + λ)
proposed by Bordalo et al. (2012), in which 𝜆 ≥ 0. Having fixed the utility and salience functions, the time
discount factor 𝛿 (which we let be the annual discount factor) is the only parameter that may vary, and so
we report the full range of 𝛿 values consistent with each behavior for each example. Somewhat surprisingly,
our ‘parameter-free’ specification of the salience functions is sufficient to predict all behaviors studied in
this paper, even with linear utility, and even if 𝛿 is fixed at a plausible annual discount factor (e.g., 𝛿 =
0.9). We provide a more formal treatment of the behaviors discussed in this section in the appendix.

2

For example, Moyer and Landauer (1967) found that it takes adults longer to answer the question "Which number
is larger, 2 or 3?" than to answer the question "Which number is larger, 2 or 7?"
3
The time salience function might also compare two payoffs in period 0 and so we define 𝜃(𝐫, 𝐭) as in (9) when it is
not the case that 𝐫 = 𝐭 = 0 and we set 𝜃(𝟎, 𝟎) = 0.
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3.1

The Common Ratio Effect and the Common Difference Effect
We begin with two of the best-known anomalies for choices under risk and over time: the special

case of the common ratio effect known as the certainty effect and the special case of the common difference
effect known as present bias. The certainty effect is a systematic violation of expected utility theory. A
classic example due to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 3.
Figure 3. The Common Ratio Effect (Risk) and the Common Difference Effect (Time)
Common Ratio Effect

Common Difference Effect
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In the figures in Section 3, the typical choice patterns are highlighted in bold font. In Figure 3, a
decision maker chooses between lotteries p and q and between p′ and q′. Lottery p offers $3000 with
certainty. Lottery q offers an 80% chance of receiving $4000. Expected utility theory predicts a decision
maker will choose either p and p′ or q and q′. However, most subjects choose p and q′. Under SWUP, this
pattern of choices is predicted since the salient comparison is between $3000 and $0 in the choice between
p and q which favors p, and the salient comparison is between 3000 and 4000 in the choice between p′ and
q′ which favors q′. The preference for p and q′ is also predicted by our parameter-free specification in (9).
The right panel of Figure 3 displays an example of present bias based on Read and Scholten (2012).
A decision maker chooses between a ‘smaller sooner’ (SS) option and a ‘larger later’ (LL) option when the
SS payment is immediate and when both the SS and LL payments are delayed by 24 months. Discounted
utility theory predicts a decision maker who prefers $510 today (SS) to $530 in two months (LL) will also
prefer $510 in 24 months (SS′) to $530 in 26 months (LL′). However, in such choices, most people choose
SS and LL′. Under SWUP, the salient comparison is between receiving a payment in period 0 versus in two
months for the choice between SS and LL, but the salient comparison is between $510 and $530 for the
choice between SS′ and LL′. The choice of SS and LL′ is also predicted by our parameter-free specification
in (9) for all 𝛿 ∈ [0.90, 0.99]. We define the common difference effect more generally in the appendix and
prove the following result which holds for any utility functions and any salience functions.
Proposition 1: A focal thinker exhibits the common difference effect if and only if 𝜃 satisfies DAS.
Note that under SWUP, the certainty effect and present bias are both driven by a comparison against
0 (comparing $3000 to $0 and comparing a zero time delay to a 2 month delay).
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3.2

The Common Consequence Effect and the Cancellation Effect
A second parallel between risk and time preferences concerns the common consequence effect for

decisions under risk (Allais, 1953) and the cancellation effect for choices over time (Rao and Li, 2011).
Figure 4 displays a prototypical example of each effect. The common consequence effect violates the
independence axiom of expected utility, while the cancellation effect violates a similar independence
condition (the cancellation axiom) of discounted utility theory.
Figure 4. The Common Consequence Effect (Risk) and the Cancellation Effect (Time)
Common Consequence Effect (Risk)

Cancellation Effect (Time)
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In the common consequence example from Kahneman and Tversky (1979), a decision maker
chooses between lotteries p and q and between lotteries p′ and q′. Lottery p offers $2400 with certainty, and
q offers a 33% chance of $2500, a 66% chance of $2400 and a 1% chance of $0. Expected utility theory
predicts a decision maker will choose either p and p′ or q and q′. However, most subjects choose p and q′.
Under SWUP, this pattern of choices is predicted since the salient comparison is between $2400 and $0 in
the choice between p and q, and the salient comparison is between 2500 and 2400 in the choice between p′
and q′. That is, the comparison between $2400 and $0 that is cued in the first choice is not cued in the
second choice. The choice of p and q′ is also predicted by our parameter-free specification in (9).
The right panel of Figure 4 displays a prototypical example of the cancellation effect. In such
examples, SWUP predicts a shift in preference from the sooner to the delayed option when the common
consequence of -$520 in 1 month is added to both options. Similar preference reversals were observed by
Rao and Li (2011). A violation of cancellation holds if SS′ is chosen over LL′, but LL is chosen over SS.
The preference for SS′ and LL is also predicted4 by our specification in (9) for all 𝛿 ∈ [0.80, 0.99].

4

Our results are robust to whether the choice between SS and LL is represented as in the more compact frame
shown below:
SS
LL

510
-520

0
1

-520
530

1
2
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3.3

The Peanuts Effect and the Magnitude Effect
To further investigate the relationship between risky and intertemporal choices as formalized by

SWUP, we turn to an unresolved paradox in the literature: In their ‘common approach’ to risk and time,
Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) could not simultaneously explain the peanuts effect in risky choice
(Markowitz, 1952) and the magnitude effect in intertemporal choice. Prototypical examples of these effects
are illustrated in Figure 5. In the peanuts effect, behavior shifts from risk-seeking at small stakes to risk
aversion at larger stakes. In the magnitude effect, behavior shifts toward greater patience at larger stakes.
Figure 5. Illustrations of the Peanuts Effect and the Magnitude Effect
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The difficulty in reconciling these two effects has been that the peanuts effect reveals decreasing sensitivity
to payoffs at larger stakes, whereas the magnitude effect reveals increasing sensitivity to payoffs at larger
stakes. Even for decisions under risk, the most widely used specification of prospect theory (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992) does not explain the peanuts effect. The literature following Prelec and Loewenstein has
not resolved the dilemma and the difficulty in reconciling the peanuts effect and the magnitude effect has
been viewed as strong evidence that the same utility function cannot apply to both risky and intertemporal
decisions. SWUP provides a partial resolution – when one of the options in the peanuts effect is a certain
option (the type of situation where the peanuts effect is most likely to be observed), SWUP simultaneously
explains the peanuts and magnitude effects. The left panel of Figure 5 illustrates the peanuts effect in which
a person prefers a 10% chance of winning $1 over a guaranteed ten cents, but prefers a guaranteed $100
over a 10% chance of winning $1000. The peanuts effect in Figure 5 is driven by a conflict between
decreasing absolute sensitivity and increasing proportional sensitivity. At low stakes, the influence of
increasing proportional sensitivity dominates (the comparison of a dime versus a dollar is more salient than
that between a dime versus nothing). However, at larger stakes, the influence of decreasing absolute
sensitivity dominates (the comparison of receiving $0 instead of a guaranteed $100 can be more salient than
that between $100 and a small chance of $1000). For choices over time, the right panel of Figure 5 illustrates
the magnitude effect in which a person prefers $2 now to $3 in one year, but prefers $300 in one year to
$200 now. Both effects hold under our parameter-free specification from (9) for all 𝛿 ∈ [0.86, 0.93].
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3.4

Skewness Preference for Risk and Time
In this section, we demonstrate that SWUP predicts a preference for positive skewness and an

aversion to negative skewness in the distribution of payoffs for a lottery and in the distributions of payoffs
for a consumption plan. This preference for skewness is predicted by SWUP to generate the fourfold pattern
for choices under risk (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and to generate a bias toward concentration for
choices over time (Koszegi and Szeidl, 2013). The preference for skewness under risk explains the
simultaneous purchasing of lottery tickets and insurance policies. The preference for skewness over time
explains, for instance, the perception, that a newspaper subscription cost of 60 cents per day seems less
expensive than a subscription of $219 per year.
Skewness Preference for Time (Bias toward Concentration): We show that the ordering
property of salience perception can explain a pattern of behavior that Koszegi and Szeidl (2013), describe
as a bias toward concentration: People prefer alternatives with a small number of large advantages relative
to options with a large number of small advantages. In the context of intertemporal choice, such a bias
toward concentration may explain behaviors like addiction in situations where the benefits of consumption
are immediate and the costs of current consumption are distributed over many future dates. Conversely, it
implies future-biased behavior when the benefit of many periods of effort is concentrated on a single goal
(as in a career achievement).
To illustrate such behavior, consider a decision maker given the choice between a large immediate
payment of $219 for an annual newspaper subscription, or daily future payments of $0.60 for a year.
Considering the undiscounted case (i.e., 𝛿 = 1), the two options both have a value of $219, but a bias
toward concentration implies that a decision maker will strictly prefer the financing option of $0.60 per
day. As a second example, consider a decision maker deciding between two donation options to a charity
he supports: One option recommends that he make a donation of $240 today (Plan A). Another option
recommends he donates just $20 per month (Plan B). These two options are illustrated in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Charity Donation Framing Effect (Undiscounted case)
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A focal thinker deciding between Plan A and Plan B in Figure 6 will favor Plan B. Note that this
inclination will hold, even if the large immediate payment is lower than $240. For instance, suppose the
payment in Plan A is $225. Then under our parametric specification from (9), a bias toward concentration
(choice of Plan B) holds for all 𝛿 ∈ [0.88, 0.97] even though Plan A offers higher discounted utility. To
12

see why the bias toward concentration arises, note that Plan A has one large disadvantage and many small
advantages relative to Plan B. In contrast, Plan B has a single large advantage of avoiding the immediate
payment. For the undiscounted case, SWUP predicts a strict preference for B if and only if (10) holds:
𝜇(−240,0)(−240) + 𝜇(−20,0)(20)(12) < 0.

(10)

Inequality (10) holds if and only if 𝜇(−20,0) < 𝜇(−240,0). Since [−20,0] ⊂ [−240,0], the preference for
Plan B follows directly from the ordering property in Definition 5. We can formalize a bias toward
concentration more generally as follows:
Definition 6 (Bias Toward Concentration): For frame ⟦𝐀, 𝐁⟧ presenting consumption plans {𝐴, 𝐵} and
frame ⟦𝐀′ , 𝐁′⟧ presenting plans {𝐴′, 𝐵′} in Figure 7, a bias toward concentration (BTC) holds if there exists
̂ B and A′ ≻
̂ B′ for all 𝑥 > 0, while B ≻
̂ A and B′ ≻
̂ A′ for all 𝑥 < 0.
𝐧∗ ≥ 1 such that for all 𝐧 > 𝐧∗ , A ≻
Figure 7. Bias Toward Concentration
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A bias toward concentration implies a form of present bias when concentrated gains are immediate, and
future bias when concentrated gains are remote. The example of a bias toward concentration in the lower
panel of Figure 7 may be characteristic of a form of goal-seeking behavior, such as the case of a junior
faculty member who foregoes small payoffs from leisure and social activities over many periods while
focusing on the goal of obtaining tenure. For the undiscounted case, such behavior follows from ordering.
Proposition 2: Let 𝛿 = 1 and 𝑢(𝐱) = 𝐱. Then a focal thinker exhibits BTC if 𝜇 satisfies ordering.
Skewness Preference for Risk (The Fourfold Pattern of Risk Attitudes): A robust property of
observed choices under risk is the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes. A decision maker who exhibits the
fourfold pattern displays “risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses of high probability and risk
seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses of low probability” (Tversky and Kahneman 1992, p. 297). A
prototypical example is given in Figure 8. This pattern is predicted by SWUP under the specification in (9).
We also define the fourfold pattern more generally in the appendix and prove the following result:
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Proposition 3: Let 𝑢(𝐱) = 𝐱. Then a focal thinker exhibits the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes if 𝜇 satisfies
ordering, DAS, and IPS.
Under SWUP, the fourfold pattern can be summarized as a preference for positively skewed
lotteries (as they have a large upside potential) and an aversion to negatively skewed lotteries (since they
have a large downside risk). Analogously, the bias toward concentration can be summarized as a preference
for positively skewed consumption sequences and an aversion to negatively skewed consumption sequences.
Figure 8. The Fourfold Pattern of Risk Preferences
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Under the fourfold pattern for risk, a decision maker smooths payoffs (or hedges risk) when a
lottery or investment opportunity is negatively skewed (as in frames (i) and (iv) in Figure 8), and spreads
payoffs (or embraces risk) when the lottery is positively skewed (as in frames (ii) and (iii) in Figure 8). This
can explain both a preference to purchase insurance against low-probability losses and a preference to
purchase lottery tickets for low-probability gains. Similarly, for choice over time, this prediction can
rationalize both a preference for installment plans (paying $19.99 per month instead of a single payment of
$225 per year, even though the latter is less expensive) and a preference for lumps-sum payments over
annuities (even if the former are heavily taxed relative to the latter). SWUP thus makes the novel prediction
that the degree of consumption smoothing will differ for gains and losses, and that this will be analogous
to how the propensity for hedging risk differs for upside and downside risk.
3.5

Framing Opportunity Cost and Downside Risk
Frederick et al (2009) find that people do not spontaneously consider opportunity costs, but will do

so when prompted. One recent example in intertemporal choice is the finding by Magen et al. (2008) that
people do not naturally consider the opportunity costs of immediate consumption, but they are more likely
to do so, when that opportunity cost is salient. Magen et al. refer to this finding as the ‘hidden zero effect’.
We will also illustrate an analogous hidden zero effect predicted by SWUP for decisions under risk.
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Framing the Opportunity Costs of Impatience (The Hidden Zero Effect for Time): Recent
work in intertemporal choice (Magen et al., 2008; Read and Scholten, 2012; Read et al., 2017) has observed
that making the opportunity costs of choosing the sooner payoff more salient systematically shifts choices
toward more patient behavior. This ‘hidden zero effect’ is difficult to explain in a standard model of contextindependent behavior. However, SWUP provides a natural explanation for this framing effect. To illustrate,
consider the consumption plan frames in Figure 9, where the top frame conceals the zero payoffs and the
bottom frame reveals them. In the simpler (top) frame in Figure 9, the comparisons cued by the frame are
between 510 and 530 and between receiving a payoff in period 0 versus in 2 periods from now. Since the
salience of time differences (now versus 2 periods) is greater than the salience of payoff differences, a focal
thinker will be inclined to select the sooner option. In contrast, the comparisons cued by the ‘salient
opportunity cost’ (bottom) frame are between payoffs of 510 and 0 and between 530 and 0 (highlighting
the opportunity cost of choosing the sooner option and receiving 0 instead of 530), while time differences
are less salient. Since the most salient difference (530 versus 0) favors the delayed option, a focal thinker
will be inclined to select the more patient option. Under our running parametric specification from (9), the
hidden zero effect for time holds for all 𝛿 ∈ [0.80, 0.99]. The explanation of the hidden zero effect given
by SWUP is also consistent with the finding that shifting attention from time delays to monetary amounts
induces more patient behavior (Fisher and Rangel, 2014).
Framing Downside Risk as Probabilities or Outcomes (The Hidden Zero Effect for Risk): An
analogous hidden zero effect is predicted by SWUP for decisions under risk. To illustrate, in Figure 9, the
downside risk of choosing 𝑝 over 𝑞 in the simpler (top) frame is represented by the comparison between
probabilities (the reduction in probability of winning from 0.34 to 0.33). In the ‘salient downside risk’
(bottom) frame, the downside risk is represented by the comparison between outcomes (the risk of receiving
$0 instead of $2400). The origin of the hidden zero effect is implicit in Savage’s (1954) classic book on
subjective expected utility theory. Savage proposes that Allais paradox violations of expected utility can be
reduced if the prospect format used by Allais is changed into a decision matrix which makes the normative
appeal of the independence axiom more transparent. Savage’s reframing hypothesis implies the hidden zero
effect since the choice between p′ and q′ in the top frame in Figure 9 is also part of a classic example of the
common consequence effect used by Kahneman and Tversky. Replacing the top frame in Figure 9 with the
bottom frame produces the type of presentation format that Savage suggested will reduce violations of
expected utility. Evidence consistent with the hidden zero effect for risk was observed in a number of papers
(e.g., Harless (1992), Leland (2010)). In such cases, SWUP predicts that framing downside risk as outcomes
will induce more risk-averse behavior than framing downside risk as probabilities. This effect also holds
for the specification in (9).
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Figure 9. Hidden Zero Effects predicted by SWUP for choices under Risk and over Time
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Labeling Effects for Risk and Time Preferences

Even though a focal thinker has stable preferences, SWUP also predicts systematic label framing effects
in which risk and time preferences shift in a predicted direction when changing the labeling of outcomes
from gains to losses or when changing the labeling of time periods from time delays to calendar dates.
Framing Effects between Positive and Negative Frames: Consider one of the most famous
examples of a framing effect, due to Tversky and Kahneman (1981), in which respondents are told that the
U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an epidemic which is expected to kill 600 people. Policy makers must
choose between two prevention strategies: Program A saves 200 lives. Program B has a 1/3 chance of
saving 600 people and a 2/3 chance of saving no one. A different group of respondents was given a choice
between Programs C and D, and were told that if Program C is taken, then 400 people will die. If Program
D is taken, then there is a 1/3 chance that no people will die and a 2/3 chance that all 600 people will die.
The frames of both decisions are given in Figure 10.
Programs A and C differ only in how the outcomes are labeled (as lives saved or lives lost) and
are thus logically equivalent. This observation also holds for Programs B and D. However, most people
chose A over B and chose D over C, thereby exhibiting a framing effect.
The traditional explanation for this framing effect is due to a value function that is concave for
gains and convex for losses. SWUP provides a different perspective. Under SWUP, Program A is chosen
over Program B if saving 0 lives versus saving 200 lives is more salient than saving 200 lives versus 600
lives. In addition, D is chosen over C if having 0 deaths versus 400 deaths is more salient than having 400
deaths versus 600 deaths. Formally, for 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥, a focal thinker chooses Program A over Program B if
𝜇(200,0) > 𝜇(200,600). Analogously, the focal thinker chooses Program D over Program C if
𝜇(−400, −600) < 𝜇(−400,0). Both of these inequalities hold for the parameter-free specification from
(9). SWUP thus yields the choice for A over B in the ‘lives saved’ frame and the choice for D over C in the
‘lives lost’ frame, as observed by Tversky and Kahneman.
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Figure 10. Framing Effect between Positive and Negative Frames
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Framing Effects between Date and Delay Frames: The format in which time periods are presented can
also significantly affect the degree of discounting. For instance, Read et al. (2005) identified a robust
framing effect in which they observed more patient behavior when time periods were presented as calendar
dates than when they were presented as delays (numbers of weeks or months) prior to the receipt of a
monetary reward. An example of this ‘date-delay effect’ from their experiment is presented in Figure 11.
Read et al. found that subjects typically opted for $370 in 17 weeks instead of $450 in 56 weeks in the delay
frame, but preferred the delayed $450 payment when the same time interval was presented in calendar dates.
If the salience of calendar dates can be approximated in this example by the comparison between 2003 and
2004, then under SWUP, the framing effect is explained, if 𝜃(17,56) > 𝜃(2003,2004), which can be
shown to be implied by the properties of ordering and diminishing sensitivity of the time salience function
𝜃. Thus, SWUP not only predicts a date-delay framing effect, but it predicts the effect in the observed
direction. Moreover, under SWUP, this context-dependent shift in discounting is driven by changes in
salience perception and is predicted even if the decision maker has stable time preferences. Under our
running parameter-free specification, the date-delay effect is predicted by SWUP for all 𝛿 ∈ [0, 0.95].
Figure 11. The Date-Delay Framing Effect in Intertemporal Choice
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The Etiology of Choice under Risk and over Time
In addition to showing in Section 2 that SWUP applies the same mathematical structure and the

same psychological intuition to choices under risk and over time, we demonstrated in Section 3 that SWUP
predicts a set of analogous behaviors across the two domains. These behaviors are summarized in Table 1.
The predicted set of behaviors has strong empirical support and has not previously been explained in a
unified model. In addition, the same simple parameter-free specification explains each of these effects.
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Although relatively short, the list of analogous behaviors between risk and time summarized in
Table 1 is surprisingly comprehensive. Moreover, all of these behaviors can be explained by SWUP as
salience effects. Thus all behaviors in Table 1 can be explained through the same underlying mechanism –
systematic overweighting of differences in payoffs, probabilities, and time delays, where the weights are
endogenous and satisfy basic properties of human salience perception. Interestingly, all of the contextdependent shifts in risk-taking and time discounting summarized in Table 1 are explained even if the
decision maker has stable (context-independent) risk and time preferences given by 𝑢 and 𝛿.
Table 1. Parallels between Risk and Time Predicted by SWUP
Operations on Lottery Frames

The Etiology of Choice under Risk

Representative Reference

Add Common Consequence

Common Consequence Effect

Allais (1953)

Scale Probabilities by Constant

Common Ratio Effect (Certainty Effect)

Kahneman & Tversky (1979)

Scale Outcomes by Constant

Peanuts Effect

Markowitz (1952)

Change Skewness of Distribution

Fourfold Pattern of Risk Attitudes

Tversky & Kahneman (1992)

Change Salience of Downside Risk

Hidden Zero Framing Effect (Risk)

Savage (1954)

Change Attribute Labels

Gain-Loss Framing Effect

Tversky & Kahneman (1981)

Operations on Temporal Frames

The Etiology of Choice over Time

Representative Reference

Add Common Consequence

Cancellation Effect

Rao & Li (2011)

Add Constant to Time Periods

Common Difference Effect (Present Bias)

Laibson (1997)

Scale Outcomes by Constant

Magnitude Effect

Prelec & Loewenstein (1991)

Change Skewness of Distribution

Bias Toward Concentration

Koszegi & Szeidl (2013)

Change Salience of Opportunity Cost

Hidden Zero Framing Effect (Time)

Magen et al. (2008)

Change Attribute Labels

Date-Delay Framing Effect

Read et al. (2005)

Table 1 also displays the formal operations one can perform on a lottery or consumption plan to transform
it into a different lottery or consumption plan and the corresponding behaviors predicted by SWUP to
result from each operation. Regarding the anomalies in Table 1, note that the certainty effect and standard
present-biased behavior in smaller-sooner versus larger-later choices are special cases of the common
ratio effect and the common difference effect, respectively.
5.

Related Literature
Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) were the first to recognize parallels between the major anomalies

for risk and time. For instance, they recognized an intuitive relationship between the common ratio effect
and the common difference effect, and between the peanuts effect and the magnitude effect. They also
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recognized the role of IPS and DAS in explaining some of these anomalies. However, the model they
proposed does not explain the peanuts effect or any of the anomalies in sections 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 or 3.6. In the
present paper, we have extended the discussion of parallels between risk and time to include the common
consequence effect and the cancellation effect, the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes and a bias toward
concentration, the hidden zero effects for risk and time, and framing effects due to changing the labeling of
attributes. In addition to the striking similarity in these behaviors for risk and time, we have shown that
these effects are each predicted by SWUP.
Aside from the early contribution of Prelec and Loewenstein, the standard approach has been to
develop domain-specific models. For instance, the major models for choice under risk such as rankdependent utility (Quiggin, 1982), regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Bell, 1982), and prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) were developed only for risk preferences. Similarly, the major
models for choice over time such as the hyperbolic discounting model of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992),
Laibson’s (1997) model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and the recent advance by Koszegi and Szeidl
(2013) were developed only for time preferences.
The strong parallels that SWUP predicts for risky and intertemporal choice enables SWUP to
explain behavior in choices over time that cannot be explained by cumulative prospect theory (CPT) due to
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) which does not apply to intertemporal choice. Even for choice under risk,
there are notable differences between SWUP and CPT. For instance, CPT does not explain the downside
risk framing effect depicted in Figure 9, and the most commonly applied version of CPT with a power value
function cannot explain the peanuts effect, even allowing for any probability weighting function.
To provide a unified explanation of choices under risk and over time, models by Leland (2002) and
Rubinstein (2003) advocated an approach based on similarity judgments. That approach can explain present
bias, and is analogous to the earlier models of similarity judgments that explain the common ratio effect
(Rubinstein, 1988; Leland, 1994). Although these similarity models were based on a strong psychological
intuition, they were largely qualitative, based on the notion of a similarity relation without formalizing
when two payoffs or time delays were similar or different. Bordalo et al. (2012) pioneered an approach to
choice under risk which provided a quantitative approach to formalizing aspects of salience perception. A
fundamental structural difference between the model of Bordalo et al. and SWUP is that the Bordalo et al.
model only accounts for the salience of payoffs, whereas SWUP incorporates both the salience of payoffs
and the salience of probabilities. In addition, Koszegi and Szeidl’s model accounts only for the salience of
payoffs, whereas SWUP incorporates both the salience of payoffs and the salience of time delays. By
accounting for probability salience, Leland, Schneider, and Wilcox (2017) extend SWUP to choice under
uncertainty and demonstrate that diminishing sensitivity of the probability salience function explains
ambiguity aversion in Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox which is not accounted for by the model of Bordalo et al.
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(2012). Similarly, by accounting for time salience, we establish in Proposition 1 that diminishing sensitivity
of the time salience function explains standard present bias behavior as illustrated by the common difference
effect that is not accounted for by the model of Koszegi and Szeidl (2013).
Of behaviors in Table 1, quasi-hyperbolic discounting explains only present bias and the model of
Koszegi and Szeidl explains only a bias toward concentration. Koszegi and Szeidl write:
“Yet because our theory does not match evidence in single choices, it is not a complete theory of
choice over time, and a complete theory would have to incorporate hyperbolic discounting or a
related model as well.” (Koszegi and Szeidl, 2013, p. 85).
The SWUP model provides a unified explanation for the six behaviors for intertemporal choice
summarized in Table 1 as resulting from a perceptual system that is biased to focus on salient differences
in payoffs and time delays and also predicts a directly analogous set of six broad empirical findings for
choice under risk. Rather than relying on quite distinct domain specific models (e.g., prospect theory for
risk, quasi-hyperbolic discounting for time), SWUP provides a unified approach to choices under risk and
over time. However, SWUP is also an incomplete theory as it does not account for interaction effects
between risk and time that have been observed for choices involving both risk and delays (Keren and
Roelofsma, 1995; Baucells and Heukamp, 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Hardisty and Pfeffer, 2017).
In the recent literature, attention has turned to integrating risk and time preferences. This literature
was pioneered by Halevy (2008) who developed a model that accounts for some systematic interactions
between risk and time (based on experimental results that risk affects time preference). Perhaps the most
successful model to date in providing a unified treatment of risk and time preference is the probability time
tradeoff (PTT) model of Baucells and Heukamp (2012). Notably, the PTT model accounts for three
systematic interaction effects between risk and time preferences when choices involve both risk and time
delays as well as some other fundamental behaviors such as the common ratio and common difference
effects. Although SWUP does not account for interactions between risk and time, it encompasses a broader
set of parallels between risk and time than previous approaches and explains all 12 behaviors in Table 1.
6.

Conclusion

Choices under risk and over time have traditionally been studied separately, and the notions of impatience
and risk tolerance are distinct concepts. The model of salience weighted utility over presentations (SWUP)
proposed here generalizes the classic expected and discounted utility models to predict endogenous changes
in the salience of payoffs, probabilities, and time delays. Surprisingly, under SWUP, the same mathematical
structure and the same psychological intuition predict a wide range of analogous behaviors between risky
and intertemporal choice and unify these behaviors as examples of salience effects. Moreover, the 12
context-dependent shifts in risk taking and time discounting we have studied are predicted by SWUP, even
if salience weights are parameter-free, and even if the decision maker has stable risk and time preferences.
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Appendix: Formal Results for Behaviors under Risk and over Time
In this appendix, we provide more formal discussions of the behaviors illustrated by example in
Section 3. For our results, we consider the case where both options in the frame have equal expected utilities
(for risk) and equal discounted utilities (for time) to highlight the predictions arising from differences in
salience. For a focal thinker, we write the expected utility of lottery 𝑝 (the agent’s assumed preferences in
the absence of salience distortions) as 𝐸𝑈(𝑝) and the discounted utility of consumption plan 𝑟 as 𝐷𝑈(𝑟).
Also, in our analyses to follow, the definitions of behaviors are adapted to our setting (using the perceptual
̂ from Section 2 which depends on both the agent’s preferences and the agent’s salience
relation ≻
perception, instead of the agent’s preference relation ≻).
A.1

The Common Consequence Effect
We first provide a more formal definition of the common consequence effect

Definition 7: (Common Consequence Effect): Consider the frames in Figure 13, where 𝐱 > 𝐲 > 𝟎, 𝐪 >
̂ 𝐩 and 𝐩′ ≻
̂ 𝐪′.
𝐩, and 𝐪, 𝐩 ∈ (0,1). The common consequence effect holds if 𝐪 ≻
Figure 13. The Common Consequence Effect
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Proposition 4: Let 𝐸𝑈(𝑝) = 𝐸𝑈(𝑞). Then a focal thinker exhibits the common consequence effect if and
only if 𝜇(𝟎, 𝐲) > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲) > 𝜙(𝐩, 𝐪).
Remark: For both the classic Allais example in which (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑝, 𝑞) = ($5 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛, $1 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛, 0.10, 0.10),
and for the Kahnemman and Tversky example in Figure 4, the condition in Proposition 4 holds for the
salience functions in (9). For the Kahneman and Tversky example, the necessary and sufficient condition
in Proposition 4 becomes 𝜇(0,2400) > 𝜇(2500,2400) > 𝜙(0.33,0.34). That is, the common consequence
effect holds if the perceived downside of receiving $0 instead of $2400 outweighs the upside of receiving
$2500 instead of $2400, but this $100 difference in payoffs outweighs the 0.01 difference in the probability
of winning. The explanation of SWUP for the choice of 𝑞 over 𝑝 is similar to Bordalo et al. (2012), with
both explanations based on payoff salience. However, the Bordalo et al. explanation for the choice of 𝑝′
over 𝑞′ is based only on payoff salience and assumes that agents interpret the choice as between statistically
independent prospects, and evaluate options as if they compare $2500 and $2400, $2500 and $0, $2400 and
$0, and $0 and $0). It seems more likely to us that the choice between 𝑝′ and 𝑞′ is determined by the salience
of payoffs ($2500 versus $2400) contrasted with the salience of probabilities (0.33 versus 0.34).
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A.2

The Common Ratio Effect
We next provide a definition of the common ratio effect:

Definition 8 (Common Ratio Effect): Consider the frames in Figure 14, where 𝐱 > 𝐲 > 𝟎, and 𝐜, 𝐩 ∈
̂ 𝐩 and 𝐩′ ≻
̂ 𝐪′.
(0,1). The common ratio effect holds if 𝐪 ≻
Figure 14. The Common Ratio Effect
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Proposition 5: Let 𝐸𝑈(𝑝) = 𝐸𝑈(𝑞). Then a focal thinker exhibits the common ratio effect if and only if
𝜇(𝟎, 𝐲) > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲) > 𝜙(𝐜𝐩, 𝐜).
Remark: For the example of the common ratio effect in Figure 3, the necessary and sufficient condition in
Proposition 5 becomes 𝜇(0, 3000) > 𝜇(4000, 3000) > 𝜙(0.20, 0.25). That is, the common consequence
effect holds if the perceived downside of receiving 0 instead of 3000 outweighs the perceived upside of
receiving 4000 instead of 3000, but this $1000 difference in payoffs outweighs the 0.05 difference in the
probability of winning. These conditions also hold for the parameter-free specification in (9).
A.3

The Peanuts Effect
Next, we provide a definition of the peanuts effect:

Definition 9 (Peanuts Effect): Consider Figure 15, where 𝐱 > 𝟎 and 𝐩 ∈ (0,1). The peanuts effect holds
̂ 𝐪 and there is some 𝐤 > 𝟏 such that 𝐪′ ≻
̂ 𝐩′.
if 𝐩 ≻
Figure 15. The Peanuts Effect
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Proposition 6: Let 𝐸𝑈(𝑝) = 𝐸𝑈(𝑞). Then a focal thinker exhibits the peanuts effect if and only if
𝜇(𝐱𝐩, 𝐱) > 𝜇(𝐱𝐩, 𝟎) and 𝜇(𝐤𝐱𝐩, 𝟎) > 𝜇(𝐤𝐱𝐩, 𝐤𝐱).
A.4

The Fourfold Pattern of Risk Attitudes
We next demonstrate that, for linear utility, SWUP implies the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes for

any salience function 𝜇 that satisfies ordering, diminishing absolute sensitivity, and increasing proportional
sensitivity. Our approach is to demonstrate that half of the fourfold pattern (risk aversion for gains and risk
seeking for losses of high probability) is implied by ordering and DAS. We then demonstrate that the other
half of the fourfold pattern (risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses of low probability) is implied
by IPS. We first provide a simple behavioral definition of commonly observed risk preferences:
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Definition 10 (Risk preferences at moderate to high probabilities): Consider the frames in Figure 16 of
a choice between a representation 𝐩 of a lottery 𝑝 and its expected value, 𝐄(𝐩), where 𝐱 > 𝐲 ≥ 0.
(i)

̂ 𝐩 for all 𝐩𝟏 ∈[0.5,1).
Risk aversion for gains at moderate to high probabilities holds if 𝐄(𝐩) ≻

(ii)

̂ 𝐄(𝐩′ ) for all 𝐩𝟏 ∈[0.5,1).
Risk seeking for losses at moderate to high probabilities holds if 𝐩′ ≻
Figure 16. Diminishing Absolute Sensitivity and Attitudes toward Risk
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To isolate the role of salience perceptions in governing risk attitudes, we state the following proposition for
the case where the utility function is linear.
Lemma 1: Consider the frames in Figure 16 and let 𝑢(𝐱) = 𝐱. Then for all 𝐩𝟏 ∈ [𝟎. 𝟓, 𝟏] a focal thinker is
risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses if 𝜇 satisfies ordering and DAS.
̂ 𝐩 if and only if 𝜇(𝐲, (𝐱 − 𝐲)𝐩𝟏 + 𝐲) > 𝜇(𝐱, (𝐱 − 𝐲)𝐩𝟏 + 𝐲).
Proof: For 𝑢(𝐱) = 𝐱, 𝐄(𝐩) ≻
For 𝑝 = 0.5, DAS implies 𝜇(𝐲, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲)) > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲)). To see that DAS implies that this
inequality holds, let 𝛜 = 0.5(𝑥 − 𝑦). Then 𝜇(𝐲 + 𝛜, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲) + 𝛜) = 𝜇(𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲), 𝐱), which by
symmetry, equals 𝜇(𝐱, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲)). For 𝐩𝟏 ∈ [0.5,1], note that [𝐱, 𝐱𝐩𝟏 + 𝐲(𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏 )] ⊆ [𝐱, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲)]
and thus ordering implies 𝜇(𝐱, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲)) ≥ 𝜇 (𝐱, 𝐱𝐩𝟏 + 𝐲(𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏 )). Thus, 𝜇(𝐲, 𝟎. 𝟓(𝐱 + 𝐲)) >
𝜇 (𝐱, 𝐱𝐩 + 𝐲(𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏 )) for all 𝐩𝟏 ∈ [0.5,1]. The result for losses follows analogously. ∎
For the case where 𝐩𝟏 = 0.5, Lemma 1 requires only DAS. In conjunction with DAS, ordering
implies that the result extends to all 𝐩𝟏 ∈ [𝟎. 𝟓, 𝟏]. This stronger result implies that if we observe riskseeking for gains or risk aversion for losses, such behavior will occur at low probabilities, consistent with
the experimental observation of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
Whereas DAS and ordering have implications for risk preferences at moderate and high
probabilities, IPS has implications for risk preferences over low probability outcomes. Consider the frames
in Figure 17, where we set 𝐱 > 0, 𝐤 ≥ 𝟐, and 𝐄(𝐩) = 𝐄(𝐪). Frames (i) and (ii) each involve a choice
between a sure option and a mean-preserving spread. Setting 𝐤 ≥ 2 ensures that the payoff with the largest
absolute value occurs at low probabilities. For 𝐤 = 2, we have 𝐩𝟏 = 1/3, independent of 𝐱, and 𝐩𝟏
decreases toward 0 as 𝐤 increases, holding 𝐱 fixed. In the figure, 𝐩𝟏 is the unique value determined by the
requirement that 𝐄(𝐩) = 𝐄(𝐪). For 𝐱 = $1, and 𝐤 = 1,000,000, the choice in frame (i) resembles the
decision of purchasing a lottery ticket (𝐩𝟏 ~ 0.000001), and the choice in frame (ii) resembles the decision
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to insure against low-likelihood disasters. For such large values of 𝐤 relative to 𝐱, the payoff 𝐱/𝐤 is
essentially 0 and its inclusion may be viewed as merely a technical condition. Thus, for large 𝐤 and small
𝐱, the frames in Figure 16 approximate a choice between a lottery with one non-zero outcome occurring
with probability 𝐩𝟏 , and its expected value. Formally, we have the following definition:
Definition 11 (Risk Preference at low probabilities): Consider frames (i) and (ii) in Figure 17, where
𝐱 > 0, 𝐤 ≥ 2, and 𝐄(𝐩) = 𝐄(𝐪):
(i)

̂ 𝐩.
Risk-seeking for gains at low probabilities holds if 𝐪 ≻

(ii)

̂ 𝐪′
Risk aversion for losses at low probabilities holds if 𝐩′ ≻
Figure 17. Increasing Proportional Sensitivity and Attitudes toward Risk
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Lemma 2: Let 𝑢(𝐱) = 𝐱. Then for frames (i) and (ii) in Figure 17, a focal thinker is risk-seeking for
gains at low probabilities and risk-averse for losses at low-probabilities if 𝜇 satisfies IPS.
Proof: We show that IPS implies risk-seeking for low-probability gains. Risk aversion for low probability
losses follows analogously. Given 𝑢(𝐱) = 𝐱, a focal thinker always chooses 𝐪 over 𝐩 if and only if
𝐱

𝐱

𝟏−(𝟏/𝐤)

𝜇(𝐱, 𝐤𝐱)(𝐱 − 𝐱𝐤)𝐩𝟏 + 𝜇 (𝐱, 𝐤) (𝐱 − 𝐤) (𝟏 − 𝐩𝟏 ) < 0. Since 𝐸(𝐩) = 𝐸(𝐪), we have: 𝐩𝟏 = 𝐤−(𝟏/𝐤).
Thus, 𝐪 is strictly preferred to 𝐩 if and only if
𝜇(𝐱, 𝐤𝐱)(𝐱 − 𝐱𝐤) [

𝟏 − (𝟏/𝐤)
𝐤−𝟏
] + 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐱/𝐤)(𝐱 − 𝐱/𝐤) [
] < 0,
𝐤 − (𝟏/𝐤)
𝐤 − (𝟏/𝐤)

which can be rewritten as 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐱/𝐤)𝐱 [

(𝐤−𝟏)(𝟏−(𝟏/𝐤)
]
𝐤−(𝟏/𝐤)

< 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐤𝐱)𝐱 [

(𝐤−𝟏)(𝟏−(𝟏/𝐤))
],
𝐤−(𝟏/𝐤)

which implies

𝜇(𝐱, 𝐱/𝐤) < 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐤𝐱). Then by symmetry and increasing proportional sensitivity, we have
𝐱

𝐱

𝜇(𝐱, 𝐤𝐱) = 𝜇(𝐤𝐱, 𝐱) = 𝜇 (𝐤𝐱, 𝐤 (𝐤)) > 𝜇 (𝐱, 𝐤). The result for losses follows analogously. ∎
Definition 12 (Fourfold pattern): An agent who is risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses at high
probabilities, as defined in Definition 10, and is risk-seeking for gains and risk-averse for losses at low
probabilities, as in Definition 11, exhibits the fourfold pattern of risk preferences.
Proposition 3 (Fourfold Pattern of Risk Preferences): Let 𝑢(𝐱) = 𝐱. Then, by Lemmas 1 and 2, a focal
thinker exhibits the fourfold pattern of risk preferences if 𝜇 satisfies ordering, DAS, and IPS.
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A.5

The Hidden Zero Effect for Choice under Risk
We next provide a formal definition of the hidden zero effect for risk:

Definition 13: (Hidden Zero Effect for Risk): Consider the two choice frames in Figure 18, for which
̂ 𝐪 in the simpler (top)
𝐱 > 𝐲 > 𝟎, 𝐪 > 𝐩, and 𝐩, 𝐪 ∈ (0,1). The Hidden Zero Effect for risk holds if 𝐩 ≻
̂ 𝐩 in the “salient downside risk” (bottom) frame.
frame and 𝐪 ≻
Figure 18. The Hidden Zero Effect for Risk
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Proposition 7: Let 𝐸𝑈(𝑝) = 𝐸𝑈(𝑞). Then a focal thinker exhibits the hidden zero effect for risk if and only
if 𝜇(𝟎, 𝐲) > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲) > 𝜙(𝐩, 𝐪).
A.6

The Cancellation Effect
The Cancellation Effect in intertemporal choice can be defined as follows:

Definition 14: Consider the frames in Figure 19 where 𝐲 > 𝐱 > 𝟎, and 𝐭 > 𝐫 ≥ 𝟎. The Cancellation
̂ LL and LL′ ≻
̂ SS′.
effect holds if SS ≻
Figure 19. The Cancellation Effect
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Proposition 8: Let 𝐷𝑈(𝑆𝑆) = 𝐷𝑈(𝐿𝐿). Then a focal thinker exhibits the cancellation effect if and only if
𝜃(𝐫, 𝐭) > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲).
The cancellation effect also requires 𝜇(𝐱, 𝟎) < 𝜇(𝟎, 𝐲) but this inequality is guaranteed by the ordering
property. For the example in Figure 4, the condition in Proposition 8 becomes 𝜃(0, 2) > 𝜇(520,530) which
holds for the parameter-free specification in (9) and is consistent with intuition that the difference between
a 0 time delay and a 2-month delay is more salient than the difference between $520 and $530.
A.7

The Common Difference Effect
We next provide a formal definition of the common difference effect.

Definition 15 (Common Difference Effect): Consider frames (i) and (ii) in Figure 20, for any 𝐲 > 𝐱 >
̂ 𝐒𝐒′.
0, 𝐭 > 𝐫 ≥ 0, and any 𝚫 > 0. The common difference effect holds if 𝐒𝐒 ~
̂ 𝐋𝐋 implies 𝐋𝐋′ ≻
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Figure 20. Properties of Time Preferences Predicted by SWUP
Simple Consumption Plans
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Proposition 1: A focal thinker exhibits the common difference effect if and only if 𝜃 satisfies DAS.
Proof: Note that a focal thinker views 𝐒𝐒 and 𝐋𝐋 to look equally good if and only if (11) holds:
(11)

𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲)(𝑢(𝐲) − 𝑢(𝐱))(𝛿 𝐫 + 𝛿 𝐭 ) = 𝜃(𝐫, 𝐭)(𝛿 𝐫 − 𝛿 𝐭 )(𝑢(𝐲) + 𝑢(𝐱)).

A focal thinker always chooses 𝐋𝐋′ over 𝐒𝐒′ if and only if inequality (12) holds:
(12)

𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲)(𝑢(𝐲) − 𝑢(𝐱))(𝛿 𝐫+∆ + 𝛿 𝐭+∆ ) > 𝜃(𝒓 + 𝚫, 𝒕 + 𝚫)(𝛿 𝐫+∆ − 𝛿 𝐭+∆ )(𝑢(𝐲) + 𝑢(𝐱)).

By factoring out 𝛿 ∆ and by substitution, we see that the common difference effect holds if and only if we
have 𝜃(𝐫, 𝐭) > 𝜃(𝐫 + 𝚫, 𝐭 + 𝚫), which holds for any ∆> 0 if and only if 𝜃 satisfies DAS. ∎
For the typical example in Figure 3, the common difference effect holds for the specification in (9).
A.8

The Magnitude Effect
The magnitude effect can be defined as follows:

Definition 16 (Magnitude Effect): Consider frames (i) and (iii) in Figure 20. The magnitude effect holds
̂ LL and LL′ ≻
̂ SS′.
if for all 𝐤 > 1, SS ≻
Proposition 9: Let 𝐷𝑈(𝑆𝑆) = 𝐷𝑈(𝐿𝐿). Then a focal thinker exhibits the magnitude effect if and only if
𝜇(𝐤𝐱, 𝐤𝐲) > 𝜃(𝐫, 𝐭) > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲).
Note that if 𝜇 satisfies IPS, we have 𝜇(𝐤𝐱, 𝐤𝐲) > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲) for all 𝐤 > 𝟏.
Next, we state and prove our finding on the bias toward concentration from Section 3.4, and then
demonstrate a more formal result for the hidden zero effect over time.
A.9

The Bias Toward Concentration

Proposition 2 (Bias Toward Concentration): Let 𝛿 = 1 and 𝑢(𝐱) = 𝐱. Then if 𝜇 satisfies ordering, a
focal thinker exhibits a bias toward concentration.
Proof: In the undiscounted case, for 𝐱 < 0, we have 𝜇(𝐧𝐱, 𝟎)𝐧𝐱 < 𝜇(𝐱, 𝟎)𝐧𝐱 in the choice between A and
B and also in the choice between A′ and B′, which hold for all 𝐧 > 1 if 𝜇 satisfies ordering. Conversely,
for 𝐱 > 0, we have 𝜇(𝐧𝐱, 𝟎) > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝟎) in the choice between A and B, and in the choice between A′ and
B′, which hold for all 𝐧 > 1 if 𝜇 satisfies ordering. ∎
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A.10

The Hidden Zero Effect for Choice over Time

Definition 17: Consider Figure 21, where 𝒚 > 𝒙 ≥ 𝟎, and 𝐭 > 𝐫 ≥ 𝟎. The Hidden Zero effect for time
̂ LL in the left frame and LL ≻
̂ SS in the ‘salient opportunity cost’ (right) frame.
holds if SS ≻
Figure 21. The Hidden Zero Effect
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Proposition 10: Let 𝐷𝑈(𝑆𝑆) = 𝐷𝑈(𝐿𝐿). Then a focal thinker exhibits the hidden zero effect for time if and
only if 𝜃(𝐫, 𝐭) > 𝜇(𝐱, 𝐲).
For the example in Figure 9, the condition in the proposition holds for the specification in (9).
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